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DIGITAL TV, COPY CONTROL, AND
PUBLIC POLICY
JONATHAN WEINBERG*
The premise of this symposium is that, in the age of the In-
ternet, copyright and communications law have converged - that
one cannot think about one without the other. Not too long ago,
copyright lawyers and communications lawyers saw one another
only rarely. Copyright lawyers concerned themselves with private
law, and communications lawyers with public law. Copyright law-
yers were, somewhat romantically, involved with authors and deal-
making; communications lawyers roamed the cold corridors of the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "the Commis-
sion"). Communications lawyers were taught to look to the First
Amendment as their ultimate restraint and policy guide;' copyright
lawyers lived in a first-amendment-free zone.2
Back then, there was no such thing as an "Internet lawyer."
When the need for such a being arose, copyright and communica-
tions lawyers both volunteered with alacrity. The ranks of those
trying to understand Internet law and regulation, and to guide cli-
ents through its mazes, came to include folks with backgrounds in
both fields. Their perspectives were different: copyright lawyers (it
seems to this non-copyright lawyer) tend to view Internet law from
a copyright-centric perspective, consciously or unconsciously set-
ting up the vindication of the exclusive rights held by publishers as
the foundation of all Internet regulation.3 Communications law-
yers, by contrast, are public lawyers focusing on government and,
more generally, governance. Yet to an increasing extent, both have
come to see that, when they wear their "Internet lawyer" hats, they
are engaged in public policy. Specifically, they are engaged in in-
formation policy: they are working out the rules for what informa-
tion can be communicated over the Internet, to whom, and on
what terms, and what bodies are to be empowered to restrict or
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I am grateful to Monroe Price and Peter
Yu, for causing me to write this paper, and to Jessica Litman, for making it work.
1 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
2 See Jessica Litman, Symposium: Copyright Owners' Rights and Users' Privleges on the In-
ternet: Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 DAYrON L. REv. 587 (1997); see also
Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in
Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998).
3 See Litman, supra note 2, at 589.
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condition that movement. To that extent, to the surprise of law-
yers in both camps, they are in the same field.
And yet there is another story to tell. After all, it is hardly a
new thing for communications law policymakers to recognize copy-
right concerns. Communications policymakers first took copyright
into account, and constructed copyright substitutes when true cop-
yright protection was unavailable, decades ago.4 They recognized,
long before the Internet, that copyright's restrictions on copying
and dissemination of speech were public policy, and indeed public
policy within their sphere. Similarly, it was decades ago that copy-
right owners first sought to use the tools of communications law to
advance their interests. Along the same lines, the anti-circumven-
tion provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act'
("DMCA") have their roots in the communications-law techniques
that Home Box Office ("HBO") used to protect its scrambled satel-
lite feed in the mid-1980s. In that sense, both copyright lawyers
and FCC regulators have been doing information policy all along.
I argue in this Article that, in a recent proceeding, FCC policy-
makers lost sight of the historical relationship between copyright
and communications law. In a rulemaking last year on cable distri-
bution of digital television programming, the FCC declined to rec-
ognize that restrictions on consumer copying of broadcast
programming pose an information policy issue within its area of
concern.6 It thus failed to come to grips with the public-policy is-
sue that the rulemaking presented.
In Part I of this article, I will very briefly describe some of the
FCC's involvement with copyright and related concerns in its regu-
lation of cable and satellite-delivered television. In Part II, I will
explain some of the changes in the world of copy control that have
taken place since the FCC's initial involvement. And in Part III, I
will discuss the FCC's treatment of copy control issues in last year's
digital television rulemaking.
I. COPYRIGHT AND COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
The FCC first took serious notice of copyright in the late
1960s. Cable was getting off the ground in significant part through
the carriage of broadcast signals imported from other markets.
Opponents of the new medium - broadcasters, unhappy with
4 See infra notes 9-25 and accompanying text.
5 See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
6 See In re Implementation of Section 304 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 18199 (2000).
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what they deemed unfair competition, and program production
studios, urging that cable retransmission deprived them of control
and compensation - developed a two-prong attack. First, broad-
casters pressed the FCC to clamp down on distant-signal retrans-
mission, and the agency did so: it forbade new cable systems to
carry distant signals except pursuant to FCC approval or waiver.7
Second, a Hollywood studio filed suit against the cable companies,
claiming that cable retransmission of broadcast signals was copy-
right infringement.8 When the Supreme Court found no copyright
violation, the broadcasters returned to the FCC. This time, the
agency gave them what they wanted. The Commission would no
longer seek to establish, on a case-by-case basis, whether a cable
system's distant-signal retransmission would serve the public inter-
est. Instead, it promulgated a new rule under which a cable system
operating within thirty-five miles of a top one hundred market
could carry commercial distant signals if, and only if, it had the
permission - the "retransmission consent" - of the originating
station, on a program-by-program basis.9
What motivated this shift? Part of the answer lay in the fact
that the hearing process was simply not working well. But another
part related to the broadcasters' and studios' copyright-based argu-
ments. As the agency later explained, the phrase "unfair competi-
tion" had come to be attached in its deliberations to "a set of issues
which sounded principally in copyright," though "to some extent
in less well defined notions that it was inequitable for CATV and
commercial broadcasting to compete freely when the former did
not pay for the programming it re-transmitted."' ° The proposal for
retransmission consent was "intended to rectify the 'unfair compe-
tition,"' pending "passage of legislation bringing CATV within the
7 The Commission's rule barred cable systems in the one hundred largest television
markets (containing ninety percent of all television households) from carrying any non-
local broadcast signal, unless the Commission found after hearing that such carriage
"would be consistent with the public interest," and particularly "the establishment and
healthy maintenance of... television broadcast service" in the area. In re Microwave Relay
Authorization, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 782 (1966); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1968) (upholding the FCC rule). The Commission grandfathered
the continued carriage of certain distant signals. 2 F.C.C.2d at 784-85. The hearing process
was "unworkable," and provided no relief to cable systems. See Inquiry Into the Economic
Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 650
n.48 (1979) [hereinafter Economic Inquiry Report]. The agency did, though, grant over
one hundred waivers of the requirement in small markets. See id. at n.48.
8 See United Artists Tel., Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
affd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d. Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
9 See 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968); In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 148-50, 153 (1972).
10 Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 7, at 651.
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copyright laws." 1 It was "a kind of jerry-built substitute" for the
copyright decision the Supreme Court had declined to hand
down.1 2 Indeed, cable interests later protested that the FCC's ac-
tion usurped Congress's power to make copyright legislation be-
cause the consent requirement operated "as though a change had
been made in the copyright laws."1"
Of course, that was not the end of it. The FCC rulemaking
process continued. 14 There were arduous negotiations among
broadcasters, cable operators, and program producers over the
text of new copyright and communications law provisions.' 5 By
1972, the private and governmental parties reached a deal involv-
ing both new copyright legislation and a new FCC-administered
regulatory structure called "syndicated exclusivity."16 Syndicated
exclusivity, which was repealed in 1980 and reinstated in 1988,17
was designed to allow suppliers of syndicated programming to sell
exclusive rights to a single broadcast station in a given market with-
out worrying that a cable system in the same market would import
a signal including the programming."8 The FCC, in enacting the
new rules, emphasized that without syndicated exclusivity, distant-
signal importation would jeopardize "the continued supply of tele-
vision programming.., fundamental to the continued functioning
of broadcast and cable television alike." 9
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson dissented.2 0 He agreed that
copyright holders should be compensated for the use of their
products by cable system operators. 21 Yet regulations implement-
ing that right, Johnson wrote, need not take the form of exclusiv-
ity. 22 They could instead simply require the automatic payment of
fees to the copyright holders - although, he added, "I am not
convinced that the FCC is the appropriate forum in which such
11 Id.
12 Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the United
States, 39 Buw. L. REV. 615, 696 (1991) (quoting BROADCASTING, Dec. 23, 1968, at 18).
13 36 F.C.C.2d at153.
14 See id. at 143-89.
15 See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275,
329-30 (1989).
16 See id. at 330.
17 See In re Amendment of Part 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Pro-
gram Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries. 3 F.C.C. Red. 5299 (1988); see also
United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989); F.C.C. Broadcast Radio
Services, 47 C.F.R. § 76.101 (2000).
18 See 36 F.C.C.2d at 149-50.
19 Id. at 169.
20 See id. at 306.
21 See id. at 309.
22 See id.
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decisions should be made. '23 FCC Chairman Dean Burch an-
swered that no such compulsory license was politically feasible.2 4
Rather, the exclusivity provision - protecting the copyright
owner's rights to control its product, and thus its continued ability
to produce programming - was at the core of any politically
achievable solution.25
The FCC, in short, was no stranger to copyright policy thirty
years ago. It recognized that in making its own brand of informa-
tion policy for cable television (deciding what information could
be communicated over cable, to whom, and on what terms, and
what bodies were to be empowered to restrict or condition that
movement), it could not ignore copyright owners' interests in stop-
ping others from reproducing and performing their works without
permission. 26  Quite the contrary, at the core of its regulatory
agenda was the question of how its rules would promote, or de-
value, those interests.
The FCC addressed copyright holders' interests in a different
way, advancing the interest of programmers in "recover[ing] com-
pensation from all those who view their copyrighted product," in
the context of satellite TV signal scrambling.2v Initially, cable-tele-
vision programming providers such as HBO had transmitted their
signal to cable headends, via satellite, in the clear - any consumer
who invested in a home satellite dish could pull in the signal for
free. 28 Cable programmers began investigating the possibility of
scrambling those signals, and in 1984, Congress amended 47
U.S.C. § 605 to make clear that the willful, unauthorized reception
and de-scrambling of such scrambled signals was a federal crime.2 9
HBO began scrambling its signal in January 1986.3o
The FCC applauded the criminalization of unauthorized de-
scrambling. "Property rights in goods and services sold," it urged,
"are an important prerequisite for markets to function well."3 By
allowing copyright owners to recover compensation from all view-
23 Id.
24 See id. at 290.
25 See id. at 292.
26 See supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text.
27 Inquiry into the Scrambling of Satellite Television Signals and Access to those Signals
by Owners of Home Satellite Dish Antennas, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 1202, 1204 (1988).
28 See id. at 1202.
29 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000). Indeed, the
statute continued, even the reception of an unscrambled signal was a crime if there were "a
marketing system ... established under which an agent or agents have been lawfully desig-
nated for the purpose of authorizing private viewing by individuals," and the viewer had
not received that authorization. Id.
30 See Video Pirate Interrupts HBO, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1986, at C24.
31 3 F.C.C. Rcd. at 1203.
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ers, it continued, scrambling promotes both efficiency and equity,
and thus serves the public interest.3 2 Unauthorized reception of
scrambled programming, a "deplorable and serious" matter, would
threaten the viability of satellite television distribution.3" The Com-
mission recommended that Congress consider beefing up its crimi-
nal penalties.34
In crucial respect, it is worth noting, the satellite scrambling
issue was not a copyright problem at all. Nobody asserted that con-
sumers, in decrypting a scrambled signal, were violating the copy-
right laws; plainly, they were not. 5 The programmers' complaint
was not that consumers were copying, or publicly performing,
works to which they already had lawful access. Rather, it was that
they were gaining access to the programming in the first instance
without the owner's authorization, something the FCC described as
32 See id. at 1204.
33 See id. at 1206.
34 See id. at 1211. As the DBS industry evolved, the FCC continued to grapple with
copyright issues. The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 created a sharply limited copy-
right license for the transmission of television-station signals via direct broadcast satellite,
increased the penalties for consumers' decoding scrambled programming without authori-
zation, and called upon the FCC to think about imposing syndicated exclusivity rules on
satellite transmission. See Pub. L. No. 100-667 §§ 201-07, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (1988) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). Over time, it became plain that the
narrowness of the copyright license was the factor most sharply limiting satellite TV's devel-
opment. Under the 1988 Act, a satellite carrier had a copyright license to distribute net-
work television signals only in the rare situation where the subscriber lived outside the
"Grade B" contour of any broadcaster affiliated with that network (and had, at least ninety
days before, terminated his subscription to any cable system carrying the network's signal).
See id § 202 (creating 127 U.S.C. § 119(a)). This sharply decreased the attractiveness of
satellite TV because it meant that the vast majority of prospective subscribers were legally
barred from receiving their most-viewed channels over the satellite. They could receive all
but three of their television channels from the satellite, but had to switch to a rooftop
antenna to receive the rest.
The DBS industry, to considerable extent, ignored the limitations placed on it by the
copyright law, and signed up subscribers without regard to their legal eligibility. One satel-
lite carrier, for example, responded to the statutory requirement that it not offer network
signals to any person residing within the "Grade B" contour of a network station by inform-
ing prospective subscribers that in order to receive service, they were required to answer
"No" to the question whether they could receive an acceptable over-the-air picture from
the station, and transcribing their duly proffered responses. See ABC, Inc. v. Primetime 24
Joint Venture, 17 F. Supp. 2d 467, 470 (M.D.N.C. 1998), affd in relevant part, 184 F.3d 348
(4th Cir. 1999). When copyright holders sued, and federal courts issued injunctions under
which millions of Americans would lose their satellite service, the matter was dumped back
before the FCC. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Primetime 24Joint Venture, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D.
Fla. 1998). That agency, while considering its hands largely tied, recommended to Con-
gress that it consider a variety of changes to the copyright statute. See 14 F.C.C. Rcd. 2654,
2697-99 (1999). Congress incorporated part of that recommendation into legislation en-
acted later that year. See Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, 113 Stat. at 1501A-526 to
1501A-545.
35 It would have been copyright infringement - an unauthorized "public perform-
ance" - for such a consumer to play the decrypted programming in a public place, such as
a large restaurant. But the decryption was irrelevant to that cause of action; it was also
copyright infringement for a paid-up, authorized subscriber to play the programming in
such a place. See 47 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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simple theft of services (or, adopting the word that the cable indus-
try had come to use, "piracy").36 Indeed, the scrambling imposed
no limitations on the ability of viewers with legal de-scramblers
(and authorized access) to make as many copies as they wanted of
the programs.
This distinction between access and copying is an important
one. Access relates to a consumer's initial access to a work; copying
relates to his ability to copy, or otherwise to manipulate, a work to
which he already has lawful access. The problem the FCC ad-
dressed in connection with signal scrambling was thus an access
issue. In the days before pay broadcast and cable - that is, before
the 1980s - access control was not much of an issue for content
owners. Copyrighted works were typically embodied in physical ob-
jects, such as books. The only way to get access to the underlying
media work was to be in possession of the physical object. The laws
of personal property provided all of the access control that copy-
right owners knew how to exploit. As a result, their focus was on
controlling unauthorized copying, through which new physical ob-
jects could be created. Where media works could be viewed or
heard without access to the physical objects (as with broadcast ra-
dio or television), copyright owners did not seek to restrict con-
sumers' access directly. Nobody needed permission from a radio
broadcaster to listen to radio programming.37
When copyright owners ramped up their interest in access
control in the 1980s, the copyright law provided them with no assis-
tance. It spoke only to copying, public performance, public distri-
bution, and the creation of derivative works - not to access
simpliciter. Thus, content owners relied on other tools. In the sat-
ellite scrambling context, the first tool was technological. Scram-
bling the signal made it impossible for viewers to get a usable
picture using the technology normally available to them. The sec-
ond was legal. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (a non-copyright statute) made it
illegal for users to view the programming even if they were able to
descramble it. 38
II. THE NEW WORLD OF COPY CONTROL
HBO's decision to scramble its satellite signal was the precur-
36 See Inquiry into the Scrambling of Satellite Television Signals and Access to those
Signals by Owners of Home Satellite Dish Antennas, supra note 27, at 1205.
37 But cf supra notes 6-27 and accompanying text (noting that copyright holders did
seek to maintain market exclusivity through devices such as retransmission consent and
syndicated exclusivity).
38 See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
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sor to a more extensive transformation of copyright (and related)
law. Over the past few years, the nature of copyright law has
changed. First, copyright owners became increasingly concerned
with access control issues. More and more, media works came to
be embodied in streams of electronic bits set to "1" or "0," or in
radio waveforms broadcast or transmitted by wire, where the con-
sumer routinely sought to access the work without ever having to
own a corresponding physical artifact. Drawing on the lessons of
satellite scrambling, publishers looked to technological measures
to limit access to the work. This enabled them not only to charge
for access, but to do so in new and potentially more lucrative ways
- making a movie available for viewing in a consumer's living
room, for example, only on a pay-per-view basis.39
Second, copyright owners increasingly came to experiment
with technological measures to enforce copy control limitations as
well. Technological protection measures, after all, have obvious
advantages from the perspective of copy control. They are much
more effective than mere liability rules in achieving the goal of
stopping consumer copying (or other interaction by the consumer
with the work). Further, by making it physically impossible to copy
a work without the permission of the publisher, they moot the
question of whether a particular act of copying is in fact illegal.
They thus offer the opportunity to restrict copying beyond the lim-
its prescribed by the copyright law.
Only a few years ago, copyright was pretty much entirely about
law. The essential nature of copyright law was to prescribe a set of
activities that were actionable. If a company engaged in those ac-
tivities, copyright owners could seek legal remedies against it.4 0 To-
day, though that traditional aspect of copyright law is still very
much with us, 4 1 copyright law increasingly seems to be about tech-
nical protection measures.
Congress ratified and accelerated these changes by enacting
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"). 42 The
DMCA was designed to enhance publishers' ability to put in place
technological measures that restrict access to, or copying of, media
works except on the publishers' terms. The statute makes it illegal
39 See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted
Systems, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1251 (2000) (discussing the use of trusted-systems technology to
control access to informational works).
40 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
41 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 121 S. Ct. 2381 (2001); UMG Recordings v.
MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
42 See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
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to "descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work,"
or otherwise to "circumvent" any technological measure a copy-
right owner has put in place to control access to a work." It makes
illegal the manufacture or distribution of any technology whose
primary purpose is to circumvent a technological measure a copy-
right owner has put in place to control access to a work.4 4 Finally,
it makes illegal the manufacture or distribution of any technology,
whose primary purpose is to circumvent a technological measure a
copyright owner has put in place to prevent copying, public per-
formance, adaptation or public distribution of a work.4 5
Publishers have devised a variety of creative technological
means for implementing copy control and otherwise regulating
consumers' interaction with the works to which they have bought
access. One important approach was developed by the Motion Pic-
ture Association of America ("MPAA"), and embodied in CSS - the
"Content Scramble System" for DVDs.46 When the Hollywood
movie studios were getting ready to distribute movies on DVDs,
they didn't want to rely solely on the deterrent or moral-suasion
value of their claim that it was illegal for consumers to make digital
copies of DVD movies.4 7 Rather, they wanted technological mea-
sures ensuring that it would be impossible for consumers to do
so.48 Specifically, they wanted to ensure that all devices capable of
reading DVDs would incorporate technology making it impossible
for a consumer to use that device to produce a playable copy of the
movie.4 9
43 17 U.S.C. §1201 (a) (1) (making it illegal "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt
an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a techno-
logical measure, without the authority of the copyright owner," where the work is pro-
tected by copyright and the technological measure, "in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work").
44 See id. § 1201(a) (2) (making it illegal to "manufacture, import, offer to the public,
provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof," if the technology is primarily designed or produced, or marketed for the
purpose of enabling violations of § 1201 (a) (1)).
45 See id, § 1201(b) (making it illegal to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, pro-
vide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part
thereof" for the purpose of "avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise im-
pairing a technological measure" where "the measure, in the ordinary course of its opera-
tion, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of" rights granted to copyright
owners by the copyright law).
46 See generally JESSI A LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
47 Indeed, it seems likely that at least some noncommercial home copying of DVDs
qualifies as fair use, and is not illegal at all. See In re Implementation of Section 304 of
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, 15 F.C.C.
Rcd. 18199, 18211 n.70 (2000).
48 See Paul Sweeting, Backend: DVD Protection Faces 'Fair-Use' Challenge, VAIETY, Apr. 2-9,
2000, at 20.
49 See id.
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A moment's thought will demonstrate the problems they faced
in achieving that goal. The Hollywood movie studios don't make
DVD players. How were they to ensure that any DVD player, made
by any third party, would necessarily incorporate technology disa-
bling it from making a playable copy? Even if major consumer-
electronics manufacturers were willing to build such limitations
into their equipment, how could the MPAA ensure that small or
upstart manufacturers would do the same?
The MPAA's solution was ingenious. Its answer was to encrypt
the movies before placing them on the disks.5 ° In approaching the
consumer-electronics manufacturers, MPAA explained that, in or-
der for the movies to be playable, the manufacturers would have to
license decoding technology from a body affiliated with the
MPAA.5' As part of those license terms, the manufacturers would
have to enter into a variety of agreements governing what their
players would be capable of doing. 2 Most importantly, the manu-
facturers would have to agree that any device they built, incorporat-
ing the licensed decoding technology, would be incapable of
exporting a clean, decoded digital file that could be used to make
additional copies.53 This approach presented no bar to large-scale
piracy; most importantly, it did not prevent would-be pirates from
simply duplicating DVDs onto new disks, bit by encrypted bit, with-
out ever bothering to decrypt the file.54 But it did stop ordinary
home-users from getting access to clean, "in the clear" digital ver-
sions of movies that they could then watch, copy, transmit or ma-
nipulate using computers or consumer-electronics devices that
were not subject to the CSS license.
The only thing with the potential to undermine this copy con-
trol was the widespread public distribution of software that allowed
consumers to decrypt movie DVDs so that they could be played on
computers not subject to the CSS license.55 In late 1999, a teen-
ager in Norway developed such a program; he called it "DeCSS."5 6
The program was widely distributed on the Internet, and the stu-
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.; Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
53 See LITMAN, supra note 46, at 152. Other license restrictions required manufacturers
to disable their DVD players from playing DVDs released in other geographic regions, and
from skipping certain commercials. Id.
54 See E-mail from David R. Guenette, former Editor, Emedia Professional, to David Far-
ber, Professor, University of Pennsylvania, (Jan. 5, 2000), available at http://
www.interesting-people.org/200001/0015.html.
55 See Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
56 See id. at 311.
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dios then moved to assert their rights under the DMCA.17 They
sought injunctions against anyone who posted, or who linked to,
the DeCSS code.58 When one organization responded by selling
protest T-shirts displaying the code, the DVD Copy Control Associ-
ation (which administered the CSS license) sought an injunction
against that.59 The Southern District of New York held, in Universal
City Studios v. Reimerdes, that a publisher's mere linking to a third-
party website containing a copy of the DeCSS code should be en-
joined as a violation of the DMCA.6 °
III. CoPY CONTROL AND DIGITAL TV
What, you may ask, has all of this got to do with the FCC?
Consider a form of copy control currently planned for a medium
squarely within FCC jurisdiction: digital television, received by con-
sumers via their cable systems.6" At the outset of the FCC's ill-
starred effort to roll out digital television, MPAA and other content
owners made it clear that they were troubled by the prospect of a
consumer hooking up some sort of player/recorder to his televi-
sion, the same way one can hook up a VCR today, and exporting
clean digital copies of movies and television programming.62
Traditional copyright law says that consumers are allowed to make
such copies up to the limits of fair use.63 But MPAA sought a tech-
nical solution so that it would not be bound by the substantive and
enforcement limitations of statutory copyright law.6 4 The solution
it came up with exactly paralleled the CSS plan it had already used
for DVDs.65
The FCC in 1998 had ordered a new cable-box architecture, in
57 See id. at 304.
58 See id. at 312.
59 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin, No. CIV 786804, 2000 WL 48512 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2000). That lawsuit was brought under trade secrecy law, not under the
DMCA. See id.; LITMAN, supra note 46, at 163-64 n.3.
60 See 111 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
61 See generally In re Implementation of Section 304 of Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 18199 (2000).
62 MPAA initially approached the matter as one of technical standards to be resolved in
industry fora, with minimal public input; it worked with the Copy Protection Technical
Standards Working Group, an industry working group addressing the matter in context of
standards for the design of digital set-top boxes, to find a CSS-like solution. See Federal
Communications Commission, Comments of Motion Picture Ass'n of America, available at http:/
/gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&id-document=2152610001
(Sept. 12, 1998).
63 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding
that consumers had a fair use privilege to make copies of analog television programming
for time-shifting purposes).
64 See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18206.
65 Sed, at 18211.
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which a digital cable converter box's "ancillary" functions - chan-
nel tuning, remote control, video program guide access, etc. - are
separated from its access control technology, which prevents the
consumer from viewing programming she hasn't paid for.6 6 Digital
boxes providing the ancillary functions are produced by consumer-
electronics manufacturers and sold in a competitive market, rather
than being supplied to subscribers by cable operators as part of the
subscription. The cable operators, for their part, provide the
descrambling (access control) technology as a plug-in module for
the third-party cable boxes. In order to watch descrambled pro-
gramming, the consumer must insert a security module provided
by the cable operator into her third-party cable box.6 7
In order for these markets to operate, there must be a stan-
dard interface between the security module and the cable box (or
other device receiving the security module, such as a cable-ready
television or VCR).68 That interface was developed, with the FCC's
blessing, by CableLabs, a joint venture that serves as the research
arm of the cable industry.6 9 The interface includes an encryption
feature known as DFAST (Dynamic Feedback Arrangement Scram-
bling Technique).7 The gist of the DFAST technology is this: im-
agine that a set-top box receives a scrambled HBO signal. It passes
that signal to the security module, which checks whether the sub-
scriber is authorized to get HBO, and, if so, unscrambles it. It then
re-scrambles it, purely for the duration of the signal's trip back to the
set-top box, and the set-top box finally removes the new scrambling
using technology it has licensed from CableLabs.7' That license,
however, comes with certain conditions.7 2
The license provides that digital programming will be marked
with instructions from the content provider to allow zero, one, or
unlimited copies of the particular work.7 3 If the work is marked as
66 See In re Implementation of Section 304 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, 13 F.C.C. Rcd. 14775 (1998). See generally Gen-
eral Instrument Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
67 Cable operators have been required to make the modular security components avail-
able separately, allowing consumers to buy third-party cable boxes, since July 1, 2000.
Cable operators may continue to offer integrated boxes to consumers who wish to buy
them untilJan. 1, 2005. See 13 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14778-79. The FCC is reconsidering the latter
deadline. See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18202-03.
68 See 13 F.C.C. Rcd. at 14806; 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18201-02.
69 See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18201-02.
70 See id. at 18205.
71 See id at 18205 n.35.
72 See id. at 18205.
73 See POD Host Interface License Agreement, exh. C, § 3, attached to Letter from Rich-
ard R. Green, President, CableLabs, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, FCC (Dec. 15, 2000) (on
file with author).
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"copy never," the licensed device must be designed to prevent any
copying, recording or storage of the work in digital form.74 The
device cannot export the work even in standard-definition analog
form capable of being recorded, copied or stored, without first ad-
ding a Macrovision signal designed to make the image dark and
unpleasant to watch.75 Finally, if a viewer chooses to watch "copy
never" digital programming in high definition analog form, the de-
vice must have the capability to degrade the image so that it cannot
even be viewed except in lower-definition form.76 The rules are the
same for work marked as "copy once," except that the licensed
product may have the capability to make a single copy,77 viewable
only on that device and incapable of being exported to any other
player.78
Circuit City protested that the DFAST license was inconsistent
with FCC rules. 79 The agency's cable-box architecture rules, it
urged, forbade the cable operators from using contracts or licenses
to limit the features that a set-top box might offer (so long as it did
not defeat access controls) .8 Further, it argued, the restrictions in
the DFAST license impinged on consumers' ability to engage in
"fair use" copying of television and cable programming. 81 After all,
the impact of the DFAST license is that programmers will have to-
tal control of whether viewers can make home copies (even analog
copies) of any television programming.82 That is far different from
the status quo, in which consumers can freely and legally make
home copies of analog programming for noncommercial
purposes.83
The FCC, with only brief discussion, rejected Circuit City's
claim.8 4 Nothing in its cable-box architecture rules or its earlier
74 Further, it must be robustly engineered to prevent user hacking that would defeat
the anti-copying technology. See id. at exh. B.
75 See id exh. C, § 2.2.
76 See id. exh. C, § 2.3.
77 See id. exh. C, § 3.5.
78 See id.
79 See In re Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment,
15 F.C.C. Rcd. 8776, 8784-85 (2000); In reImplementation of Section 304 of Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 18199,
18205-06 (2000).
80 See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18205-06.
81 See id. at 18207-08, 18211.
82 See id.
83 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). It is also
different from the technological solution Congress endorsed in the Audio Home Record-
ing Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994), under which consumers can make an un-
limited number of first-generation copies using digital recording devices, but cannot make
second-generation copies.
84 See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18211.
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decisions, the agency said, was inconsistent with a CableLabs re-
quirement that a set-top box or cable-ready television contain copy-
protection technology. 5 The FCC noted an MPAA statement that
content owners would not impose copy limitations on retransmit-
ted broadcast programs, and planned to set basic and extended
cable programming as "copy once"; the agency characterized those
intentions as consistent with "reasonable home recording."86 But
the FCC emphasized that its decision did not rest on those facts,
and that it was not holding MPAA to its representation. 7 Even if
copy limitations were more extensive, the cable-box architecture
rules would pose no bar. 8
The FCC declined to scrutinize particular details of the
DFAST license that Circuit City had highlighted; such attention
would be inappropriate, it explained, because the license terms
were not yet final.8 ' The agency continued, though, that in a fu-
ture proceeding it would invalidate a license term only on the
ground that it violated "a specific navigation devices rule.""° Since
the agency had already announced that the only possibly relevant
existing rule posed no bar, this closed off any meaningful ground
of attack.° The FCC had no existing rule relating to copy-protec-
tion issues, and it saw no argument that it would be appropriate for
it to promulgate one.9 2
The FCC opinion treats copy protection as purely a matter for
private ordering. 3 The terms on which programming is to be
made available, from the FCC's perspective, is something to be re-
solved by negotiations among content owners, cable companies
and consumer electronics manufacturers; the agency was forced to
issue a ruling only because the negotiating parties were unable to
agree.94 The agency did not regard the scope of permissible con-
sumer copying, within a larger regulatory framework government
had put in place, as raising a public-policy issue. 5 There was no
suggestion, as in earlier cases where the FCC had seen program
copying or redistribution as raising communications-policy issues,
that here too the FCC needed to consider the extent to which the
85 See id.
86 Id at 18210 n.67.
87 See id. at 18211.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id at 18211 n.71.
91 See id. at 18211.
92 See id.
93 See generally id. at 18209-12.
94 See id. at 18212.
95 See id at 18211-12.
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regulatory structure promoted or restricted consumer reproduc-
tion of the programs they received.96
One might argue that this decision should be distinguished
from earlier cases in which the FCC gave close scrutiny to copy
control matters. In the earlier cases, content owners complained
that others were accessing or reproducing their works in ways that
were not, or should not be, permitted by ruling law.97 In this case,
by contrast, content owners are locking up their works so as to ex-
ercise greater control than the law offers them.9" In the earlier
cases, content owners were able to raise the specter that they would
cease producing works altogether, or would abandon the distribu-
tion channel, if they were not able to control access to and repro-
duction of their works.99 Here, consumers, who are the ones most
injured by the technological restrictions, make no comparable
claim.
Yet both cases address key elements of what used to be seen as
the copyright-law balance. Historically, in debates over the extent
of copyright rights, there was general agreement that creators
should have some exclusive rights but not others"'° It was good
public policy, for example, for creators to have the exclusive rights
(subject to exceptions) to make copies and distribute a work pub-
licly; that legal rule encouraged the creation of still more works.'O°
But it was good public policy as well that the scope of copyrightable
subject-matter should be limited, that members of the public
should be able to engage in limited copying that fell within the
"fair use" exception, and that a publisher should have no control
over the physical object in which a work is embodied, once that
work left its hands (so that copyright law gives the publisher no
control, say, over whether a buyer re-sells a book after reading it, or
over how many times the book can be read). 0 2 The MPAA's plan
for digital television will upset that balance, to the detriment of the
public interest. It is not only the invasion of copyright owners'
rights that poses a public-policy problem; it is the undue expansion
of those rights as well.
The FCC's answer to these concerns was terse: "We note that
nothing in our decision is intended to alter 'fair use' under ex-
96 See supra notes 7-34 and accompanying text.
97 See id
98 See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18206.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 19 and 33.
100 See generally LITMAN, supra note 46, at 77-88.
101 See Litman, supra note 2, at 597.
102 See id.
292 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
isting law." °'0 Yet this misses the point. To be sure, the new digital-
television architecture does not change the copyright law, render-
ing consumer copying a violation of that law. Rather, it renders it
unlawful for consumer-electronics manufacturers to produce de-
vices that can make the (legal) copies. But the upshot is the
same-the traditional protections for noncommercial home use,
historically a concern of the copyright law, are wiped away.
It may be that the FCC was sympathetic to the copyright own-
ers' concerns because it saw merit in a claim made by Time Warner
that home copying was tantamount to theft.'1 4 Statutory law, Time
Warner noted, forbade the Commission from promulgating rules
that would impede cable operators' legal rights "to prevent theft of
services."'0 5 Further, FCC rules were explicit that they should not
be construed to authorize "equipment that would violate . .
any . . . provision of law intended to preclude the unauthorized
reception of [cable] service.' ' 6 It appears that Time Warner sug-
gested that unapproved copying amounted to "theft of services"
and "unauthorized reception"; on that basis, it continued, the law
not only permitted, but indeed required, the agency to approve
mechanisms for requiring copy protection in set-top boxes and
similar devices. 1 07
One sentence in the FCC's opinion can be read to suggest
agreement with this argument. The agency indicates opaquely, in
a footnote, that the validity of the license requiring that copy-pro-
tection technology be incorporated into the set-top box is derived
from the FCC's prohibition of equipment facilitating unauthorized
reception of service.'0 8 The statement may simply be ill-consid-
ered, not reflecting the agency's views. If it does, though, it reflects
a fundamental error, confusing access controls with copy controls.
The theft of services to which the statute and the regulations
refer is the sort of unauthorized access to programming addressed
by HBO's satellite signal scrambling and § 605.109 The FCC's cur-
rent cable set-top box architecture is explicitly designed to incorpo-
rate access controls to prevent that theft; those controls are located
in the cable companies' plug-in modules.' The copying that
DFAST technology addresses, on the other hand, is done by con-
103 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18211 n.70.
104 See id. at 18206-07.
105 47 U.S.C. § 549(b) (2000).
106 47 C.F.R. § 76.1209 (2001).
107 See 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18206-07.
108 See id. at 18211 n.66.
109 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
110 See generally 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 18199.
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sumers who have already paid for access to the service.111 The is-
sue there is not access, but copying. Indeed, it is copying that for
the most part does not appear to violate copyright, or any other,
law. There is no suggestion in the FCC's opinion that those copies
are illegal.
The essence of Time Warner's argument is that a consumer
owning a television set capable of copying a movie off the air is the
moral equivalent of her in fact copying the movie for her own use,
which is in turn is the equivalent of her transferring it to many
other people for them to watch, which is in turn the equivalent of
those people hacking into HBO so as to receive the program ser-
vice without paying, which is illegal. Yet it can hardly be that any
technology giving the consumer some control over the reproduc-
tion and uses of a work, including the ability to make legal fair-use
copies, is the moral equivalent of theft. On the contrary, tradi-
tional copyright law deliberately reserved some control over media
works to the consuming public, just as it granted other exclusive
rights to publishers. 12 Far from theft, it is the balance we have
struck.
CONCLUSION
Beginning in the late 1960s, the FCC enacted regulations de-
signed to address copyright concerns, and to plug perceived gaps
in the copyright laws. In making information policy for cable tele-
vision, it could not ignore copyright owners' interests in stopping
others from reproducing and performing their works without their
permission. At the heart of its agenda, rather, was the question to
what degree the FCC regulatory structure would promote, or de-
value, those interests. Later on, in the mid 1980s, the FCC ad-
dressed content holders' interests in a different way, seeking to
vindicate the interests of cable programmers in recovering com-
pensation from everyone who viewed their product. In that case,
when copyright owners sought to impose direct controls on unau-
thorized viewing of their programming, the copyright law was of no
aid to them. Rather, they relied on technological protections sup-
plemented by communications law prohibitions.
In recent years, content owners have increasingly adopted
technological measures to enforce both access and copy controls.
The proposed copy-control plan for digital television (modeled
closely on the MPAA's encryption of DVD movies) is one such mea-
l11 See id& at 18205 n.35.
112 See Litman, supra note 2, at 597.
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sure. As such, it implicates information-policy concerns tradition-
ally subsumed within communications law. The new digital-
television architecture, to be sure, does not change the formal law
governing consumers' behavior. But by rendering it unlawful for
consumer-electronics manufacturers to produce devices that can
make legal copies of broadcast programming, it drastically alters
what consumers can do. U.S. information policy has traditionally
given the consumer some control over the reproduction and uses
of a work, including the ability to make legal fair-use copies. Here,
as in the past, the FCC should have recognized that restrictions on
program copying and redistribution implicate important policy is-
sues within its jurisdiction.
